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Exhibit
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9.

Valle Smouse appraised the peach farm at $278,000.

(Exhibit 34; Tr.V.II,p.112,line 9 ) . The value of the business
property purchased from Eldon Ray was based upon the actual
contract amount (Exhibit 6; Tr.V.I,p.68; p.72), the appraised
book valuations (Exhibit 7; Tr.V.I,p.79,line 6; p.80,line 25) and
the current appraisals of heavy equipment (Exhibit 7 ) .
10.

Teague Eskelson appraised the

LaSal Mountain property

at $173,000. (Exhibit 11; Tr.V.I,p.106).
11.

Jamie's valuation of the LaSal property and peach farm

Volume II, pages 200-203, and are her "estimations" of value,
without having the expertise of the appraisers, but based upon
her having a "real good feel for it".

(Tr.V.II,p.200-203;

p.261,lines 2-4).
12.

Brian testified that his income was $30,000 to $35,000

per year (Tr.V.I,p.99) and in the current year he would earn
approximately $30,000 (Tr.V.I,p.100,line 5 ) .
13.

Brian submitted his tax returns for the years 1999,

2000 and 2001 showing in 1999 he made $28,000 (Exhibit 12;
Tr.V.I,p.148,line 22); in 2000, he made $40,000 (Exhibit 13;
Tr.V.I,p.149,line 24) and in 2001 he made $28,000 (Exhibit 14;
Tr.V.I,p.l50,line 13).
14. Nate Knight, Brian's accountant, testified that he did
Brian's bookkeeping and had numerically sequenced checks.
(Tr.V.I,p.147,line 22) and none of the checks were missing.
(Tr.V.I,p.187,line 9 ) .

7

15.

Jamie's former husband, Von Black, testified that he

had been present with Jamie in several other court proceedings
where Jamie testified that she was destitute and that Brian was
not providing her with any income.

She stated that she had no

interest in or income from any business and did not have the
means to sustain herself or put food on the table.
(Tr.V.I,p.132,line 6 ) . Jamie testified that Brian was not
providing the financial means the family needed to live
(Tr.V.I,p.132,line 19); that the children did not have the
clothes they needed.

Jamie testified that she had been forced to

disconnect their telephone and couldn't meet her household
obligations because of her financial circumstances.
(Tr.V.I,p.133,line 1)
16. Brian filed documents with the Utah Department of
Business Regulation for the purpose of getting his bid limit as
high as possible.

Brian stated that those documents inflated the

value of his property and the assets of his construction company
and Grand Excavation to the licensing department.
(Tr.V.I,p.84,line 18; p.85,line 19).
17.

Brian stated that the values of the assets which he

placed on the application to the Department of Business
Regulation was not based upon appraised valuations, but were
based on estimates.
18.
business.

(Tr.V.I,p.86,line 15).

Brian received only sparing income from his excavation
(Tr.V.I,p.76,1.8; p.77,line 5 ) .

8

19.

Brian provided a list of all of the jobs which he had

done in 2001.
20.

(Exhibit 10).

At the conclusion of the first day of trial, the judge

met with counsel in chambers.

The Court indicated that he

believed that the farm property, originally 14 acres and now
10.5, was premarital property, indicating that what Brian owned
coming into the property was going to be treated as separate
absent some substantial evidence of significant contribution on
Jamie's part.

Counsel were invited to provide case law.

The

Court considered the argument regarding this issue at the
beginning of the second day of trial and while the Court did not
rule at that time, the judge signaled counsel that there would
have to be some significant or substantial evidence of
contribution on Jamie's part.
21.

(Tr.V.II,p.5-13).

Brian testified that Jamie had not done anything of

significance to increase the value of the property. (Tr.V.I,p.9,
line 4 ) .
22.

Brian stated that Jamie did not help to build or

remodel the fruit shed.
23.

Brian stated that the property had not been improved

since its purchase.
24

(Tr.V.II,p.73,line 15).

(Tr.V.II,p.74,line 22).

Brian stated, contrary to the assertion of Jamie, that

the fruit trees had been purchased and put in prior to the
marriage.

(Tr.V.II,p.75,1.15-p.77,line 13; supporting Exhibit

44) .

9

25.

Jamie did not assist in putting in the trees

(Tr.V.II,p.77,line 18); did not assist in selecting any of the
trees for the property (Tr.V.II,p.77,line 20); and did not assist
in caring for the property (Tr.V.II,p.77,line 23).
26.

Jamie's children, from a previous marriage who were

ages 8 and 10, did not help plant trees or do work in the
orchard, except in the year that he turned over the crop to them
to pick and sell.
27.

(Tr.V.II,p.78,lines 7-25).

No part of the orchard was ever in Jamie's name.

(Tr.V.II,p.89,line 20).
28.

The taxes paid on the property were paid from the sale

of lots which were part of the original 14-acre peach farm.
(Tr.VII,p.74,line 9 ) .
29

Jamie indicated that she assisted in the orchard, which

included pruning trees, taking water turns and going to seminars
about the trees.
30.

(Tr.VII,p.192,line 23).

On rebuttal, Brian testified that Jamie did no work in

the orchard, stating "Jamie participated none in that orchard.

I

bought trees and planted them before I was married to her.

Never

has she done anything on the farm.

She

has never pruned.
tractor.

She has never watered.

She has never weeded.

She has never driven

She has never done anything as far as work goes."

(Tr.V.Ill,p.39,line 11).
31.

Brian testified that 14 00 trees were purchased around

March 17, 1994, and were planted immediately.
(Tr.V.Ill,p.40,line 11).
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32.

Jamie did not help plant the trees.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.63,line 1 ) . She never took a water turn,
(Tr.V.Ill,p.64,line 8 ) , he [Brian] took every water turn.
(Tr.V.III,p.65,line 15).
33.

George Roberts, the Water Master, testified that he

never saw Jamie take a water turn, (Tr.V.Ill,p.70,line 6) and
that he never saw the kids working any water.
(Tr.V.III,p.72,line 3 ) .
34.

Tom Schellenberger testified that the price of raw

ground is approximately doubled with property improvements and
impact fees.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.77,line 22). He also stated that the

real estate market was flat.
35.
was poor.
36.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.85,line 17).

Cole Noyes, a local contractor, testified that business
(Tr.V.Ill,p.87).
Brian testified that of the original 14 acres,

approximately four acres had been sold off and the money placed
into the construction of the parties' joint home and living
expenses.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.33,lines 24 - p.35).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court's valuation and division of the marital estate is
considered against the highly deferential abuse of discretion
standard.
Shepherd,

Parker

v.

Parker,

996 P.2d 565 %6, quoting Shepherd

876 P.2d 429, 433 (Ut.Ct.App. 1994); Lee v. Lee, 744

P.2d 1378, 1380 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987).
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v.

Generally speaking, questions of law are reviewed for
correctness.

The trial court's factual findings are reviewed

only if clearly erroneous.

State

v. Finlayson,

994 P. 2d 1243,116

(Utah 2000) .
Factual determinations are entitled to deference on appeal
and not reversible absent clear error.

Lysenko

v.

Sawaya,

7 P.3d

783 fl5.
An Appellate Court "will not reverse the findings of Fact of
a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are

against the

clear weight of the evidence , thus making them clearly
erroneous.

(Dept. of Human Services

945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997).

ex rel

Parker

In the Shepherd

v.

Irizarry,

case the court

stated:
" . . . The trial court has considerable latitude in
adjusting financial and property interests, and its
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity".
Naranjo v. Naranjo,
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App.
1988); Shepherd
v. Shepherd,
876 P.2d 429, 430 (Ut.Ct.
App.1994).
"This Court will not disturb the trial court's decision
[concerning property division] unless it is clearly
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion". Shepherd
id.
at 433.
And in the case of Elman v.

Elman,

443 Utah Adv. Rpt.40,1[l7,

45 P.3d 176, Hl7, the court noted:
""A trial court has considerable discretion concerning
property [division] in a divorce proceeding thus its
actions enjoy a presumption of validity". Schaumberg v.
Schaumberg,
875 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut.Ct.App. 1994). We
disturb a trial court's property division and valuation
"only when there is a "misunderstanding or
12

misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion'"".
Id. (quoting Noble v. Noble,
761 P.2d 1269, 1373 (Utah
1988)) .
ARGUMENT
I.
RESPONDENTS ASSERTION THAT THE COURT'S FINDING ON THE
PURCHASE PRICE OF THE FARM IS IN ERROR, MISCONSTRUES THE
EVIDENCE AND IS IMPROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT BECAUSE IT WAS
NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT.
There is substantial evidence that the amount paid for the
14-acre parcel of property was $300,000.

That evidence included

not only Brian's testimony, but also that of Jamie.

Exhibit 1

showed the proceeds from the sale of the property brought into
the marriage, and both parties agreed $240,000 of those proceeds
were applied to the purchase of the peach farm.

Exhibit 5

evidenced the additional amount borrowed for the purchase of the
"peach farm".
Jamie's assertion that the court made an incorrect finding
is in error and is obvious in the material provided in Jamie's
brief.

A careful review of the findings (R.164, Ul3B)/ reveals

that Brian originally paid $240,000 from premarital assets for
the farm and water shares.

That finding, when coupled with the

actual statement of the court when it made its findings, shows
without any doubt that the court understood exactly what the
purchase price was of the "peach farm".

At Transcript Volume

III, page 146, line 1, the trial court states:
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1.

"With respect to the farm property, I have
received good evidence which I believe that a
significant portion of the profits realized by Mr.
Ballard on the sale of his previous farm property
can be traced directly to the purchase of, of the
farm property, and uh, that amount is about
$240,000.»
The court then went on to address the value of that property

and indicated that it had not appreciated during the marriage:
"I believe that the present value of that property with
portions, parcels carved out of it as sales have taken
place from time to time, is about the same amount,
perhaps a little higher.(Tr.V.III,p.146,line 7 ) .
The court spoke to the debts owed by the parties an4
recognized that there was still owing approximately $63,000
against the property

(Exhibit 5 ) .

"The trust deed on the farm and that's awarded to Mr.
Ballard, burdens the farm alone and that's awarded to
Mr. Ballard and it's roughly the same amount as when
the property was purchased, so that's not going to be
treated as marital property." (Tr.V.Ill,p.149, line
20(referring to Exhibit 5)).
The court was not mistaken that the purchase price was
$240,000 from premarital assets and $60,000 borrowed.
The challenge on this finding was not preserved at the trial
level. The general rule of appellate review requires
contemporaneous objection or specific preservation for review on
appeal. (Franklin

v.

Stevenson,

987 P.2d 22, if22 (Utah 1999)),

the court quoted the case of State v. Tillman,
(Utah 1987)

In Franklin

750 P.2d 546, 551

the issue was the admission of certain

evidence that Stevenson failed to preserve by objection.

It was

necessary that the issue be preserved by specific objection.
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Franklin

quoted the case of Broberg

v. Hess,

782 P.2d 198

(Ut.Ap.App. 1989) where the court refused to address alleged
error because there was no timely objection.

The court stated:

"We agree with the necessity for both specific
preservation and timely objection before this court
will address issues on appeal".
In State

v.

Lesley,

672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 1983) the court

stated:
"This court has discretion to review the allegedly
erroneous admission of evidence when the grounds of
objection are not clearly or correctly stated.
However, the rules do not state that we may review
alleged errors when no objection at all is made at the
trial level. See e.g. State
v. McCardell,
652 P.2d 942
(Utah 1982).
After the court had made its findings, including setting out
the distribution of debt, the court invited the parties to
indicate if there were any other items which needed to be covered
or any other findings needed:
"Now, is there something I've left out to this point,
something you need me to make a finding about?"
(Tr.V.III,p.l50, line 4 ) .
Jamie did not raise any objection or request additional findings.
Jamie had yet another opportunity to object to the findings
pursuant to JRuIe 4-504

(Tr.V.Ill,p.171,line 17). The final day

of the trial was November 28, 2001.

Mr. Halls was required to

submit the proposed findings, conclusions and decree pursuant to
-Rule 4-504

within 15 days of the hearing.

Notice of Submission

of the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce, were sent to Mr. Black on December 6, 2001, within
15

the required time period.

(R.148) No objections were raised by

Mr. Black to any of the findings, in fact, no response was made
at all.

On January 2, 2002, a Notice to Submit was forwarded to

the court indicating that no response had been received from Mr.
Black and asking the court to enter the findings, conclusions and
decree.

(R.157)

The court entered the findings, conclusions and decree on
January 23, 2002, still with no response from Mr. Black.
4-504(2),

Rule

states:

"Notice of objection shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within five days after service."
The purpose of Rule 4-504
orders are finalized.

is to resolve these issues before

If no contemporaneous objection is made,

no opportunity exists for the court to change or review its
ruling.
In the case of Evans v. State,

963 P.2d 177,180 (Utah 1998)

the State had objected to the words "reasonable cause" being used
in the order where the actual

wording had been "probable cause".

The court stated:
"Regardless of the language used during the hearing the
language in the court's final written order controls
and we will presume the order correct unless
affirmatively shown otherwise. See Pena, 869 P.2d at
93 5, 93 6. However the State does not assert, nor does
the record indicate that the State objected in a timely
manner to the written order's use of "reasonable
cause'. Rule 4-504(2)
of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration provides: "Copies of proposed findings,
judgment and order shall be served upon opposing
counsel before being presented to the court for
signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of
objection shall be submitted to the court and counsel
16

within five days after service. (Utah Code of
Judicial
Administration
R.4-504(2).
* Whether the district court
erroneous referred to "probable cause1 during the
hearing is immaterial because the State accepted the
court's use of "reasonable cause' in the written order.
Having failed to properly object the State waived its
right to challenge the order in this regard on appeal.
We, therefore, hold that the trial court used the
correct reasonable cause standard in its final written
order."
Having failed to object to the court's findings when invited
to at the time of the trial and having failed to object to the
proposed findings of fact when submitted pursuant to Rule
504(2),

4-

Jamie has failed to raise the issue in the lower bourt

and has waived her right to challenge the findings on appeal.
II.
THE COURT HAD SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM WHICH TO DETERMINE
THAT THE PEACH FARM WAS SEPARATE PROPERTY AND THAT JAMIE WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO SHARE IN ANY APPRECIATION IN VALUE.
This section of Jamie's brief assails the court's finding
that the "peach farm" was Brian's separate property, but the
argument in the body is really that Jamie is entitled to share in
one-half of any increase in value because her efforts
substantially enhanced or augmented an increase in value to the
"peach farm".
In Mortensen

v. Mortensen,

760 P.2 304, 308 (Utah 1988), the

Utah Supreme Court summarized the law with regard to premarital
property and to property acquired during the marriage by one
spouse through inheritance or gift.
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The court concluded that in

Utah, trial courts making equitable property divisions pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated

§30-3-5

should:

" . . . generally award property acquired by one spouse
by gift and inheritance during the marriage or property
acquired in exchange thereof, to that spouse together
with any appreciation or enhancement of its value,
unless one of two conditions have occurred."
These conditions are stated in the following quote:
"We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making
"equitable' property divisions, pursuant to
§30-3-5
should, in accordance with the rule prevailing in most
other jurisdictions and with the division made in many
of our own cases, generally award property acquired by
one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage
(or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement
of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or
her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby
acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois
v.
Dubois,
supra, or (2) the property has been consumed or
its identity lost through co-mingling or exchanges or
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an
interest therein to the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson
v.
Jesperson,
610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) . An exception to
this rule would be where part or all of the gift or
inheritance is awarded to the nondonee or nonheir
spouse in lieu of alimony as was done in Weaver v.
Weaver,
supra. The remaining property should be
divided equitably between parties as in other divorce
cases, but not necessarily with strict mathematical
equality.
Teece v. Teece,
715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986).
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her
separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.
the 1994 case of Finlayson

v.

Finlayson,

In

874 P.2d 843, 847

(Ut.Ct.App. 1994), the court embraced the original principles set
forth in Mortensen

and the cases following wherein the Court

said:

18

"Each party should, in general, receive the real and
personal property he or she brought into the marriage
or inherited during the marriage. Mortensen
v.
Mortensen,
760 P.2d 304, 306 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Preston
v. Preston,
646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982);
accord Rappleye,
855 P.2d at 263. This includes any
appreciation of the separate property. Dunn v.
Dunn,
802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Ut.App.1990). Exceptions to this
general rule include whether the property has been comingled, whether the other spouse has by his or her
efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the
separate property, and whether the distribution
achieves a fair, just and equitable result. Id.
(citing Burt v. Burt,
799 P.2d 1166, 1168
(Ut.App.1190))."
The nonowner spouse may gain an interest in the oth§r
spouse's premarital property by contributing monetarily to it.
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg,

875 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut.App 1994), the

Utah Court of Appeals, in agreement with Mortensen

acknowledged

that while the trial court has discretion to award inherited
property in a divorce proceeding, the property, as well as its
appreciated value, is generally regarded as separate from the
marital estate and hence is left with the receiving spouse.
In Burke

v.

Burke,

733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1997), the court

rejected the husband's claim to a share of the appreciation in
his wife's inherited property since the appreciation was due
solely to market forces that occurred during the marriage.

The

increase was in no way due to the efforts or financial
contribution of the husband.
Jamie's argument III focuses on whether the property has
been co-mingled and thereby become part of the marital estate.
Here we focus on whether Jamie's efforts had contributed to the
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enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property entitling
her to share in any increase in equity.
The court's findings on this issue are found in Transcript
Volume III, pages 146-147.

Exhibit 1 establishes that Brian

received approximately $258,000 from the sale of the Bar M
Chuckwagon and its accompanying property.

There is no question

that the Bar M was his sole property and that Jamie did not share
in any appreciation in that property.

The best determiner of the

value of Brian's property from his prior marriage is what it
actually sold for, not what Brian and Lenea decided between
themselves what the value would be.

The court found that the

proceeds from the Bar M were traceable directly to the 14-acre
"peach farm". (Tr.V.III, p.146, line 2)

The court said that the

present value of the property, referring to the appraisal of
Valle Smouse (Exhibit 34), was approximately the same with the
parcels carved out. (Tr.V.Ill,p.146, line 7 ) . The Court stated
that it had not heard any evidence that persuaded him, apparently
referring to Jamie's testimony, that any contributions made by
Jamie resulted in any enhancement to the value of the property.
(Tr.V.Ill,p.146,line 11). There is no appreciable increase in
value.
On the disputed issue of how much effort Jamie put into the
orchard, the court had testimony which included the document
showing when the trees had been purchased and planted (Exhibit
44) and the statements of George Roberts indicating he had never
seen Jamie or her kids take a water turn, which were both
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independent of either party, and weigh in favor of Brian
(Tr.V.Ill,P.146,line 15). The court stated that he chose to
weigh that testimony heavier, so in choosing between the two
accounts, the court found that Brian's account as to how much
effort Jamie put into the property, was more reasonable and
believable.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.146,line 21).

The court referred to the appraiser's testimony where she
had set the value of the property, not based upon the value of
the orchard and trees which were there, but on the value of the
property for development.

The court found that any appreciation

in the value of the property was due to market forces, not to the
action of either of the parties.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.147,line 2 ) . The

court stated that Jamie had not provided evidence that would
persuade the court it would be inequitable to treat the peach
farm as Brian's separate property. (Tr.V.Ill,p.147,line 5 ) .
Thereby, the court's determination was that Brian was entitled to
his premarital property, together with any appreciation in value
based upon market forces.
A word about valuations.

In Section II of Jamie's brief,

she mischaracterizes the amount of equity that would have been
available.

Jamie wants to calculate the equity of the peach farm

as the difference between the $112,000 value placed on the Bar M
property by Brian and Lenea (Tr.V.I,p.26-27), and the purchase
price of the peach farm (which Jamie incorrectly states here as
$240,000).

These are two completely separate properties. The

best measure of the Bar M and accompanying property is what it
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sold for seven month later, $258,000, rather than the value
arbitrarily placed on the property by Brian and Lenae, without
benefit of any appraisal.

Certainly, Jamie was not entitled to

any interest in equity or enhancement of the Bar M property.

If

any person had a claim that the Bar M was undervalued by Brian,
it would have been Lenea, but she was a party to setting its
value for the purpose of her divorce.
Brian took $240,000 of the proceeds from the Bar M, and
applied it to the purchase of the peach farm for $300,000 in
1995.

Brian sold three and one-half acres of the peach farm over

the years, used proceeds to build the marital residence and he
contributed the balance of those sales to marital expenses.
Brian testified that the taxes on the peach farm were paid from
the proceeds of the sale of the lots. (Trt.V.Ill,p.74, line 9 ) .
At the time of the divorce, an appraisal (Exhibit 34) placed
the value of the peach farm at $280,000.

Testimony indicated

that the appraised value must be reduced by $28,000. (lot sold to
Holyoak).

This leaves the value of the peach farm at the time of

the appraisal at $252,000, with $63,000 still left owing.

During

the marriage there were no improvements to the property which
enhanced its value (Tr.V.II,p.24,line 22); any increase in value
was due solely to market force.

The 1400 trees were purchased

and planted on the property prior to the time Brian bought it
(Tr.V.111^.40,1.11) .
The court in Elman v.

Elman,

45 P. 3d 176,3211 (Ut .App. 2002) ,

stated that a spouse who seeks an interest in the other spouse's
22

business as a marital asset has a burden to establish the value
of that business and its assets. [Citing Thomas v. Thomas,
P.2d 603 (Ut.App.1999)].
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The court also stated that a trial

court can rely on one party's valuation evidence alone if the
other party does not contradict it.

Id.

In Dunn,

the court

stated:
"The marital estate should be valued as of the time of
the divorce decree. (802 P.2d at 1320)
And further, in Parker

v.

Parker,

996 P.2d 565,1111

(Ut.Ct.App.2000), the court stated:
"As a general rule the date the decree of divorce is
entered is the appropriate valuation date. See
Rappley
v. Rappley,
855 P.2d 260, 262 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993).
Generally, the marital estate is valued at the time of
the divorce decree or trial. Accord Fletcher
v.
Fletcher,
815 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v.
Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Ut.App.1987). However, the
court has broad discretion in using a different date if
circumstances warrant, such as one party acting
obstructively, for instance, in hiding some asset.
However, if the trial court uses dates other than the
date of the divorce decree it must support its decision
with sufficiently detailed findings to explain its
deviation from the general rule."
The court in this case had every reason to use the
appraisals, not only because they were more reliable than the
"guess" made by Jamie, but they were contemporaneous with the
hearing of the divorce.

23

III.
THE PEACH FARM PROPERTY WAS NOT CO-MINGLED AND
HAS NOT LOST ITS IDENTITY AS SEPARATE PROPERTY.
Jamie's third argument deals with the issue of whether the
property was co-mingled or its identity so lost that it becomes
marital property.
The thrust of this argument is that the identity of the
peach farm has been lost through co-mingling or exchanges, or the
property has been consumed by the marriage or through gift.
It is clear that there has been no gift or interest
transferred to Jamie.

The property was originally purchased with

proceeds from Brian's prior marriage and no part of the 14 acres
has ever been in Jamie's name except for the subdivided lot on
which the marital residence sits.

(Tr.V.II,p.89,line 20).

From

the original 14-acre piece, Brian testified that he transferred
properties for the L.D.S. seminary building and others for
building lots.
Brian contributed the balance off the proceeds from the
sales and those lots to the marriage.

The money realized from

the sales generated the income to pay the taxes on the peach farm
and for the parties living expenses during periods of the
marriage.

Jamie received the benefit by sharing in the

consumption of the sales proceeds.

A portion of the proceeds

were used to build the marital home, which Jamie also shared and
was awarded in the divorce. (Tr.V.I,p.36, line 3 ) .
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The parties did not make any improvements of the remaining
acreage.

(Tr.V.II,p.74,line 22).

There was no testimony or

argument that there was substantial marital assets expended in
any improvements.

The taxes on the property were generated from

trades or sales of the property itself, (Tr.V.II,p.74,line 9) and
so no marital assets were expended in the payment of taxes.
The basis of Jamie's claim is that because various parcels
of the property were divided out and used to purchase the LaSal
Mountain property, or were used to live off and build a home
with, that the entire property should be considered to be comingled.

This is akin to the argument that if someone has an

inheritance placed in the bank and from time to time they take
$1000 and place it into the joint bank account, that the entire
amount of inheritance becomes co-mingled.

The only amounts which

become co-mingled are the amounts applied to the use of the
family.

Those portions which the person has specifically shown

a desire to contribute, share or apply to the marriage are the
only portions co-mingled.

Brian has not shown his desire to

contribute the balance of the acreage which he purchased with
premarital assets.

Had he done so, he may have placed Jamie's

name on the title to the entire property, which he did not do.
Jamie has testified that she did extensive work on the fruit
shed.

Brian contested Jamie's claim that she worked on the fruit

shed, stated she "did not assist in any way, shape or form".
(Tr.V.II,p.73,line 15). It really makes no difference as the
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fruit shed was sold or traded and the parties both enjoyed the
proceeds.
Jamie has failed to show that the parties used marital
assets, other than the payment of some consumer debts from the
sale of some of this property.

The assertion that Brian intended

the property to be contributed to the marital estate, because it
was the marital financial basis was not born out by his retaining
sole ownership of the property.
Several of the assertions Jamie makes in her appeal are
simply that, just assertions, and are not quoted to the record
nor born out by the record.

Even if they were born out by the

record, the court has signaled that it did not trust her
statements as much as it trusted or believed Brian's testimony.
(Tr.V.II,p.146, line 18) and the court stated it was skeptical of
what Jamie says because she would not respond to discovery.
(Tr.Volume II, page 168, line 1 ) .
IV
EQUITY DOES NOT DEMAND THAT JAMIE RECEIVE A
DIVISION OF THE NON-MARITAL PROPERTY.
When making an equitable order for property division upon
divorce, the court should first catagorize the properties as
being either part of the marital estate or the separate property
of one of the parties. Burt
(Ut.Ct.App 1999).

v. Burt,

799 P.2d 1166, 1172

Each party is presumed to be entitled to all

of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital
property.

Then the court should consider the existence of
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exceptional circumstances and if any be shown proceed to effect
an equitable distribution in light of those circumstances.
There is no question that courts, under the appropriate
circumstances, have the ability to divide property, including
premarital property, to make an equitable distribution.

But

there first must be an indication that the distribution is not
equitable, such as where a party is unable to meet the
obligations of child support or alimony.

Absent inequity in the

distribution of the marital estate it is within the court's
discretion not to divide the property which was considered to be
premarital.

In Bradford

v.

Bradford,

993 P.2d 887, f26

(Ut.Ct.App. 1999), the court stated:
"Generally, in a divorce proceeding "each party is
presumed to be entitled to all his or her separate
property and fifty percent of the marital property1.
Citation omitted. This presumptive rule of thumb does
not supercede the trial court's broad equitable power
to distribute the marital property regardless of who
holds title. (See Finlayson,
874 P.2d 849) . . . the
trial court may in the exercise of its broad
discretion, divide the property equitably regardless of
its source or time of acquisition. Naranjo,
751 P.2d
at 1146. (There is no fixed formula upon which to
determine a division of property in a divorce action).
A trial court may elect to distribute marital property
unequally when the circumstances of the parties dictate
a departure from the general rule (e.g. to enable one
party to fulfill an alimony or child support
obligation). See Thomas, 375 Utah Ad. Rpt. at 25; 986
P.2d at 609; see also Burke v. Burke,
733 P.2d 133, 135
(Utah 1987), [holding trial court should be guided by
general purposes of property division which is to
allocate the property in a manner which best serves the
needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue
their separate lives; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer,
745 P.2d
1276, 1279, Note 1 (Utah 1987)]." (Emphasis added).
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The general rule is that the parties who brought the
property into the marriage receive that property.

Equity will

require that each party retain the separate property they brought
into the marriage (Watson
1992).

v.

Watson,

83 7 P.2d 1, 5 (Ut.App.

Only in exceptional circumstances where there is an

indication that division of marital property would be
inequitable, may the court look to premarital properties to make
the division equitable.

There is no inequity in our

circumstance.
If this Court looks to the division made by the trial court
it will see that Jamie has received an equitable distribution of
marital property.

The court assigned all of the debt, which was

extensive, to Brian.

It then determined that there was $318,000

in marital assets, of which Jamie was entitled to half $159,000.

The court then awarded $60,000 equity in the home to

Jamie, with Brian making the house payment, and indicated that
Jamie was entitled to another $99,000 in liquid assets. Brian
offered another $11,000 if Jamie would not insist on a division
of the LaSal Mountain property; Jamie accepted.

Jamie was

awarded a marriage settlement of $110,000 to be paid within 18
months and $60,000 equity in the home, thus receiving $170,000 in
total assets and no debt. (Tr.V.Ill,p.155-6).
The court went through the process of determining Jamie's
needs for the operation of her home, making special note of the
fact she had no house payment.

After establishing what her

reasonable expenses were, the court concluded that Jamie needed
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$1250 per month in order to operate her household,
(Tr.V.III,p.168,1.4). Jamie was awarded $756 per month in child
support and $750 per month in alimony.
Brian received all of the debt of the parties,
(Tr.V.III,p.155,line 20) and the court divided the balance of the
marital property in what it stated was a perfectly equal division
or as close to that as possible.

(Tr.VIII,p.155,line 25)

Jamie was awarded equity in the home and cash payments
totaling $170,000, received $1506 in child support and alimony,
is living in a house less than five years old and has no marital
debt to pay off.

There must be some showing on Jamie's part that

this is inequitable above and beyond just disagreeing with the
decision that the peach farm was premarital property.

The cases

quoted in Jamie's brief simply indicate that the court has
discretion to make distributions of premarital property where it
cannot make an equitable distribution otherwise.

The evidence is

strong that the court considered the equities and divided the
property equally.

There is no showing that the distribution was

not equitable.
The thrust of Jamie's argument is that the court did not
take into consideration the appropriate values for the peach
farm.

The value of the peach farm does not come into

consideration unless the court determines that it cannot
equitably divide the marital property, and then must make some
distribution of the non-marital property.
position the court found itself in.
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That is not the

V.
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT BRIAN
MADE $4000 PER MONTH.
Brian testified that his income was between $30,000 and
$35,000 (Tr.V.I,p.99;p.100,line 5 ) . To support this allegation,
Brian provided documentation showing all of the work he had in
2001 (Exhibit 10). John Huff, a contractor in the Moab area
testified that work in that area was slow; that he had stayed
busy in the first year, but in the second year and every year
since, had been going downhill and it was tough to make avliving.
He stated that it was difficult for him to work 4 0 hours per
week.

Mr. Huff stated that he had tried to get jobs by

advertising, soliciting and had submitted many bids, but was
unable to secure jobs or steady employment. (Tr.V.III,p.127-128).
Nate Knight, Brian's accountant, provided documentation
taken from bookkeeping and tax preparation records which showed
that Brian made $28,000 in 1999, $40,000 in 2000, and $28,000 in
2001.

(Tr.V.I,p.148,line 22 - p.150).
Tom Schellenberger, a real estate agent and developer in the

Moab area, testified that the real estate market was flat.
(Tr.VIII,p.85, line 17).
Von Black testified that in his recent court proceedings
with Jamie, she has testified that the family was destitute, that
she received no income from any business and that Brian was
unable to provide adequately for the family and did not provide a
living wage.

(Tr.V.I,p.131-132).
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The court found that Brian did not provide $8,000 to $10,000
per month to operate the household as Jamie had alleged
(Tr.V.III,p.163,line 5) and established her needed household
expense at $1250/mo. (Tr.V. Ill P. 168). The court found that
her presentation on the subject of his income had been
inconsistent and that she had consistently in other proceedings
expressed complaints about the lifestyle she and Brian had and
his inability to provide for the family. This testimony was
inconsistent with Jamie's assertions that Brian had made $80,000
to $100,000 per year. (Tr.V.Ill,p.163, line 10).
The court found that it was hampered in its determination by
the absence of tax returns, but that this was at least partly
Jamie's responsibility as well because she had not complained
about the failure to file tax returns in the past and has
benefitted as well as Brian.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.163, line 24; p.164,

line 3 ) . .
The court made the statement that the only solid evidence
established Brian's income at $4,000 per month.

(Tr.V.Ill,p.164,

line 4; Exhibits 12, 13, 14, 25 and 26).
Jamie has simply failed to show any evidence whatsoever of
Brian's income.

Jamie's presentation focused on Brian's values

submitted to the Department of Business Licensing to establish
bid limitations.
related.

This was not "income" evidence, it is asset

The only evidence Jamie presents to establish her claim

that the court made an erroneous finding is her estimation of
what the family's expenses were, again referring back to her
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assertion that she needed $8000 to run the household, a claim
which she was unable to support with documentation.
The court had substantial evidence to determine that Brian's
income was around $4000 and only Jamie's unsupported assertions
of family expenses to indicate that this was not correct.
The court made an appropriate finding based upon the
substantial weight of the evidence.
VI
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE AND THEN
ESTABLISH THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN"
MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS PROCEEDING•
A party who seeks to overturn the factual decisions of a
court has the responsibility of marshaling the evidence.
court stated in Utah Med.

Prods,

v.

Searcy,

The

958 P.2d 228,232

(Utah 1998):
"After marshaling all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's ruling, the appellant must demonstrate
that even in the light most favorable to the trial
court, the evidence is insufficient to support the

findings.

Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance

Company,

176 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1980). We apply this
deferential standard to trial courts because of their
advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and
determine the facts. Willey
v. Willey,
951 P.2d 226,
230 (Utah 1997); see also Utah Rules of
Civil
Procedure,
Rule 52a.
If the challenger fails to meet
this burden its claim must fail."
In setting forth the standard of review in the case of
v.

Robertson,

State

932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997), the court stated:

"Before this court Robertson essentially challenges the
trial court's finding of fact. Therefore Robertson
bears the burden of marshaling all of the evidence in
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favor of the factual findings that he was malingering
then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence
is insufficient to support the court's finding."
Additionally, in the case of Whitear

v. Labor

Commission,

973 P.2d 982, 985 (Ut.Ct. App. 1998), the court stated:
"When a party fails to marshal the evidence, we assume
the record supports the commission's findings. See

Intermountain

Health

Care v. Industrial

Comm'n, 83 9

P.2d 841, 844 (Ut.Ct.App. 1992). We have shown no
reluctance to affirm when the petitioner ha sfailed to
meet its marshaling burden. See e.g. Turnbaugh
v.
Anderson,
793 P.2d 939, 944 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990).
Jamie has supported her position by reference to the record
on those issues which she contests, but has failed to set forth
all of the facts and especially those most favorable to the
court's findings below and then show why the court could not find
as it did.

Failing to marshal the evidence and demonstrate to

this court why the findings are insufficient when viewed most
favorable to the court's findings, her claims must fail.

Brian

has provided numerous references to the record setting forth the
facts which support the court's findings.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Jamie has failed to
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in any way in
reaching its conclusions.

She has failed to establish that the

decision of the court was inequitable or that the findings were
erroneous.
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The other issues raised in her appeal with regard to the
court's findings were not raised at the trial court level and
were not raised pursuant to JRule 4-504,

and are, therefore,

barred on appeal.
Jamie has failed to marshal the evidence to establish that
the court's findings were inadequate.
Having failed in all regards, her appeal must fail.

The

findings and ruling of the district court should be upheld.
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